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The development of the commodity programs in the 2008 Farm Bill involved the origination
of two complex revenue support initiatives. The two new programs, Average Crop Revenue
Election (ACRE) and Supplemental Revenue Assurance (SURE), expanded the risk man-
agement tool kit of agricultural producers. The SURE program is a permanent disaster as-
sistance program, whereas the ACRE program is a revenue-based commodity program
offered as an alternative to the price-based Direct and Counter-Cyclical Program (DCP)
created in the 2002 Farm Bill. For the 2009 signup, only 7.7% of eligible U.S. farms enrolled
in the ACRE program. In the southern region, three states had no farms electing ACRE and
four others had less than 50. Excluding Oklahoma, less than 1% of all farms in 13 southern
states made the ACRE election.
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The development of the commodity programs in
the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008
(2008 Farm Bill) was a process that involved the
origination of two very complex revenue support
initiatives.Thetwonewprograms,AverageCrop
Revenue Election (ACRE) and Supplemental
Revenue Assurance (SURE), expanded the risk
management tool kit of agricultural producers.
The SURE program is a permanent disaster as-
sistance program, whereas the ACRE program is
a revenue-based commodity program offered as
an alternative to the price-based Direct and
Counter-Cyclical Program (DCP) created in the
2002 Farm Bill. Producers enrolled in the DCP
program are eligible for direct payments, counter-
cyclical payments (CCPs), and marketing loans.
Producers with established base acreage and
direct payment yields receive an annual direct
payment for covered commodities. The annual
direct payment rate is a fixed rate established
in each Farm Bill. Base acreage and payment
yields are based on historical parameters spec-
ified in the 2002 Farm Bill. Provisions are
unchanged in the 2008 Farm Bill for most
commodities except for newly designated oil-
seed crops or newly eligible pulse crops. Base
acreage and payment yields for pulse crops and
other oilseeds are established in the same man-
nerusedforotheroilseedsinthe2002FarmBill.
Under the CCP program, producers with
historical enrolled production are eligible to re-
ceive payments on covered commodities. CCP
paymentsareonlymadewhentheeffectiveprice
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 2010 Southern Agricultural Economics Associationis less than the fixed target price (as established
ineach Farm Bill).Theeffective price isequal to
the direct payment rate for the commodity plus
the higher of the national loan rate or the na-
tional average price for the crop year. To cal-
culate the CCP payment rate, the effective price
is subtracted from the target price. The CCP
payment is equal to the product of the CCP
payment rate, payment acres (85% times base
acres), and the historical CCP payment yield.
The key element of the CCP program is the
target price. Target prices set in 2002 for corn,
soybeans, and wheat were established to meet
cost of production practices within budget pa-
rameters. However, the next 7 years manifested
higher marketing year average prices for most
covered commodities as well as increasing costs
of production relating to energy and technology.
Higher prices precluded counter-cyclical pay-
ments for many commodities.
Marketing assistance loans (MAL) are avail-
able to producers for covered commodities. The
loans provide temporary financing to producers
at harvest to meet cash flow needs without
selling their commodities at low market prices
at harvest. Producers can store the commodity
and sell at a later time. The loans are non-
recourse in nature because the producer has the
option to forfeit the commodity as collateral
and pay off the loan by delivering the pledged
collateral to the Commodity Credit Corpora-
tion (CCC). However, two options are built into
the program to discourage forfeiture. Under
certain circumstances, a producer may repay
less than the original loan principal and accrued
interest and other charges, thus receiving a
‘‘marketing gain’’ equivalent to the waived
portion of the debt. The second option for
producers is to receive a loan deficiency pay-
ment (LDP) payment. Instead of securing a
commodity loan from the CCC, producers can
receive marketing loan benefits (LDP) when
the market price is lower than the loan rate.
Marketing loan and LDP provisions make for-
feiture of loan collateral to CCC less likely,
which reduces the government’s exposure to
storage and liquidating expenses. Perhaps more
importantly from the management of a price
risk standpoint, the program generally creates
enhanced net value for the crop.
Development of a New Revenue Commodity
Support Program
Although the DCP program does provide sup-
port to producers, many were concerned that the
program does not provide an adequate safety net
for farm income. Therefore, alternative pro-
grams were designed to provide a better safety
n e tb yc o v e r i n gb o t hp r i c ea n dy i e l dr i s k .T h e
development of a revenue-based commodity
support program to replace the price-based
commodity program was widely debated. The
ACRE program was eventually chosen after
various alternatives were proposed. The pro-
posals ranged in the level of coverage of sys-
tematic risks in the target and actual revenue
calculations as well as the use of a fixed or
moving target price. Several authors analyzed
the various revenue proposals during the 2008
Farm Bill debate (Coble and Miller, 2006;
Aakre, Haugen, and Swenson, 2007a, 2007b,
2007c; Dicks and Anderson, 2007; Higgins
et al., 2007; Olson and DalSanto, 2007;
Richardson and Outlaw, 2007; Thomas, Coble,
and Miller, 2007; Zulauf, 2007, 2008).
Babcock and Hart of Iowa State University
submitted a proposal for a county revenue
guarantee (Babcock and Hart, 2005). The Bab-
cock and Hart proposal was used as the basis for
the proposal by the National Corn Grower’s
Association (NCGA). The target revenue cal-
culation was based on the county trend yield and
a moving target price (National Corn Grower’s
Association, 2006). Farm Bureau also submitted
a proposal that fell in between the two proposals
by the Administration and the NCGA. The tar-
get revenue calculation was based on the aver-
age state yield and the same fixed target price
used in the Administration’s proposal. Zulauf of
Ohio State University submitted a proposal for
a revenue plan, called the Integrated Farm
Revenue Proposal, based on U.S. yields and
amovingtargetprice(Zuluaf,2004).TheZulauf
revenue proposal was also integrated with crop
insurance and was later adopted by the Ameri-
can Farmland Trust.
The Administration submitted a proposal
for a national revenue CCP that was not in-
tegrated with crop insurance. The target reve-
nue was based on a fixed target price (2002
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2010 492Farm Bill target price minus direct payment
rate) and the average U.S. yield (United States
Department of Agriculture, 2007). Under this
plan, producers would only receive a payment
if the national revenue for a given year was
below the target national revenue. The House
adopted the Administration’s proposal in its
language, but Midwest and Plains commodity
groups were not supportive.
The Senate ultimately trumped the House
provisions for a national revenue support pro-
gram and instead chose a state-level revenue
support program designated as the ACRE pro-
gram, which combined several key aspects from
the various proposals. However, the Senate also
decided to provide producers with the option to
enroll individual farms in the old DCP program
or the new ACRE program. The ACRE program
was designed to protect against declines in
market revenue involving state- and farm-level
revenue changes from guaranteed revenue levels
based on national prices, state-planted yields,
and farm-planted yields. ACRE is a one-time
irrevocable election beginning in 2009. Once
a producer enrolls in the ACRE program, he or
she must remain in the program for the re-
mainder of the Farm Bill. However, producers
can choose to enroll in any year between 2009
and 2012. Once a producer enrolls in the ACRE
program, direct payments are reduced by 20%,
marketing loans are reduced by 30%, and CCP
payments are no longer available.
ACRE is a production program that applies
only to planted acres of a crop on the ACRE
farm. ACRE enrollment occurs by individual
farm number and payments are made on 83.3%
of planted acres up to the number of base acres
on the farm. A double trigger mechanism exists
to determine payment eligibility. The first trig-
ger is met if the actual state revenue for the crop
year is less than the state ACRE program guar-
antee. A second trigger is achieved when the
actual farm revenue for the crop is less than the
farm ACRE benchmark revenue for the crop.
ACRE payments will be made to producers only
if both triggers are met. The state and farm
benchmark revenue calculations use a moving
average rather than a fixed target price.
The state benchmark revenue guarantee is
calculated by taking 90% of the benchmark
state yield (Olympic average state yield for the
five most recent crop years) times the ACRE
guarantee price (average of the national aver-
age market price for the most recent 2 crop
years). Separate ACRE benchmark revenues
are calculated for states with a substantial
amount of irrigated and nonirrigated acreage.
The actual state revenue for a crop year is equal
to the actual state yield for each planted acre
(total production divided by the number of
acres planted) times the national average mar-
ket price for the crop year (greater of the na-
tional average marketing year price or 70% of
the MAL loan rate).
The state benchmark revenue guarantee for
a crop year cannot increase or decrease by more
than 10% from the guarantee for the preceding
crop year for the 2010, which creates a ‘‘cup
and cap’’ parameter. This feature greatly in-
creases the possibility that farmers will receive
substantial support when market prices are
high. The probability exists because support is
determined by variations in prices and yields
and can be triggered when market prices are
above DCP target prices, whereas farmers still
receive most of the direct payments that they
previously received.
The farm benchmark revenue guarantee is
equal to the farm benchmark yield (Olympic
average farm yield per planted acre for the five
most recent crop years) times the ACRE guar-
antee price plus the per-acre crop insurance
premium. Actual farm revenue is calculated by
multiplying the actual farm yield times the na-
tional average market price. The farm benchmark
and actual revenues are only used to determine
eligibility for an ACRE payment and are not
actually used in the calculation of an ACRE
payment. However, as a result of the incor-
poration of the insurance premium in the farm
benchmark revenue calculation, producers
could elect a higher level of insurance coverage
to increase their farm revenue guarantee. Al-
though this does not affect the actual payment,
it could help a farm qualify for an ACRE
payment. The ACRE payment is only based on
the state benchmark revenue and the actual
state revenue. ACRE payments are equal to the
minimum of the state benchmark revenue
guarantee minus actual state revenue or 25% of
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payments are only paid on 83.3% of planted
acres for the 2009–2011 crop years and 85% of
planted acres for the 2012 crop year.
Supplemental Revenue Assistance Program
The House chose not to incorporate a permanent
disaster program into its version of the Farm
Bill, much to the dismay of a few commodity
advocacies. However, the Senate supported a
permanent disaster program and chose to fund
the new program with customs fees. SURE
provides crop disaster assistance payments to
eligible producers on farms in disaster counties
that have incurred crop production losses, crop
quality losses, or both during the crop year. Crop
disaster payments to eligible producers will be
made at 60% of the difference between the di-
sasterassistance programguarantee andthetotal
farm revenue for the farm. The disaster assis-
tance program guarantee for a crop used to
calculate the payments for a farm may not be
greater than 90% of the sum of the expected
revenue for each of the crops for the farm.
A disaster county is a county included in the
geographic area covered by a qualifying natural
disaster declaration and any county contiguous
to a declared county. However, a farm could
also qualify if a crop year production loss re-
lating to weather is greater than 50% of the
normal production of the farm. Assuming the
farm meets one of these criteria, an additional
requirement is that the actual production yield
(APH) for at least one crop of economic sig-
nificance (generates greater than 5% of the
total crop revenue for the operation) must be
reduced by at least 10% from the APH yield as
a result of the disaster.
The SURE program provides whole-farm
disaster assistance. The calculation of SURE
benefits is inclusive of the entire farming op-
eration regardless of the location of farms. A
key requirement of the SURE program is that
producers must have private crop insurance or
NAP coverage on all mechanically harvested
crops of economic significance. Producers
growing multiple crops during the crop year
could suffer a loss on one crop but not be eli-
gible for a SURE payment as a result of the
revenue of the other crops on the farm. Large
SURE payments will only occur where signif-
icant disaster assistance program guarantees
are high as a result of high indemnity elections
and primarily monocultural crop systems. Ad-
ditionally, SURE is a revenue-based program
unlike the old ad hoc disaster programs that
were specifically yield-based and priced by the
crop insurance price for the year of claim.
SURE will account for decreases in price from
the crop insurance price levels as it calculates
farm revenues from Market Year Average pri-
ces. The program is designed to provide ‘‘gap’’
assistance for crop insurance indemnities and
ACRE revenue shortfalls. If ACRE is not
elected, the old DCP program will provide
some price support through CCP.
SURE program guarantees are based on crop
insurance coverage elected by the producer.
High-value crops such as cotton, peanuts, and
rice are on premium scales that can be un-
attractive to producers to attain greater than
a 65–70% indemnity as a cost of production
decision. Production histories for many areas in
the South have remained depressed, which fur-
ther diminishes the crop insurance indemnity
and the SURE guarantee. The new USDA Risk
Management Agency’s enterprise unit option
increases subsidies, which decreases premiums
for one crop on all farms within a county. If
a producer is willing to accept greater risk of
localized crop failures combined into the whole
farming operation, he or she can increase his or
her indemnity level for lower premiums. In fact,
this approach parallels the SURE program in its
whole farmapproach.Again, higher indemnities
create stronger program guarantees elevating the
gap coverage offered by SURE. This strategy
will vary year to year based on cropping de-
cisions and insurable price elections.
2009 Commodity Program Participation
Average Crop Revenue Election
ACRE participation was not equal across all
cropping systems. The new commodity pro-
grams do not provide the same opportunities
for all producers, especially those with cotton,
rice, and peanut acreage. The comparative higher
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ates greater participation costs for the producer
if ACRE is elected. Interest in the ACRE pro-
gram was somewhat diminished for all three
crops as a result of the impact of the 20% re-
duction in direct payments, loss of CCPs, and
30% reduction in loan rates.
As shown in Figure 1, direct payments per
base acre are higher for cotton, peanuts, and
rice producers. The target prices for cotton and
peanuts established in the 2002 Farm Bill and
maintained in the 2008 legislation have his-
torically been significantly higher than average
marketing year prices. Under the DCP pro-
gram, lower prices create higher CCPs. Since
2002, peanut producers have received CCPs
every year except 2009–2010 and cotton every
year except for 2008–2009 and 2009–2010
(Figure 2). Conversely, soybeansand wheat have
never gained a CCP and corn and grain sorghum
only received a CCP payment in 2 of the 8 years.
Rice producers received a CCP payment in only
3 of those years. The loss of potential LDPs or
marketing loan gains (MLGs) could be more of
an issue for cotton and peanut producers.
Corn, wheat, and soybean producers and their
respective representative organizations lobbied
strongly for the ACRE program to create moving
target prices rather than maintain the low target
values in the DCP program. If prices for corn,
wheat, soybeans, and rice remain above DCP
target values, no CCPs will be realized. High
market year prices in 2007 and 2008 established
strong ACRE guarantee prices for 2009.
Although the 2009 marketing year average prices
are not final, it appears that a substantial 2009
ACRE payment could be realized for wheat
producers in some southern states. Because the
ACRE price guarantee is the average of the
previous two crop year prices, an ACRE payment
could still be triggered in diminishing priceyears.
Conversely, low market year prices for cottonand
peanuts establish low program guarantees that
diminish revenue coverage from ACRE.
The complexity of farm structure in the
South reduced the incentive for many pro-
ducers to elect ACRE for the 2009 crop year.
Operations tend to have many farm numbers
that involve a multitude of owners. Each farm
has its own base structure, which affects the
amount of direct and CCP payments regardless
of what is or is not planted. The producer is
faced with a myriad of decisions and solicita-
tion of acceptance from all farm owners. The
double signup requisite for an ACRE contract
(election and enrollment) further exacerbates
the activity required. The apprehension of in-
creased lease cost exposure from involving
landlords in a new program is a major concern.
These circumstances framed the lack of par-
ticipation of producers in the ACRE program
for 2009. Oklahoma’s participation in ACRE
was driven by the disaster in wheat production
combined with the drop in prices. Because of the
late signup date, producers were able to ascertain
that a significant ACRE payment would be
forthcoming because yields and projected prices
for 2009 were well known. Figure 3 shows the
Figure 1. Direct Payment for Crop Year 2009–2010
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Oklahoma had the second largest percent of
farms enrolled in the ACRE program (only fol-
lowing Washington, which has a much lower
total ACRE farm count). Before the signup
deadline, Oklahoma, Washington, and Texas
producers had information suggesting that a high
2009 ACRE payment was likely.
However, few Texas producers enrolled in
the ACRE program. In Texas, many wheat
producers have a significant amount of cotton
base acreage, which discouraged enrollment in
the ACRE program. In addition, differences in
farm structure in Texas may have prevented
many from enrolling in ACRE. According to
recent estimates by Barnaby (2010a), Texas,
Oklahoma, Arkansas, North Carolina, Virginia,
and Kentucky are the top six states most likely
to receive a 2009 ACRE payment on wheat
based on estimates of the 2009–2010 marketing
year average wheat price.
Although the majority of producers in
Oklahoma enrolled wheat acres in the ACRE
program, a significant amount of corn and soy-
bean acres were also enrolled across the country.
As shown in Figure 4, enrolled wheat acreage
followed behind corn and soybean acreage.
Wheat producers did have a definite advantage
at signupbecause thewheatmarketing yearends
earlier than the corn and soybean marketing
years and producers had more information on
the August 14 deadline. However, because corn,
wheat, and soybean producers were at the fore-
front of the push for the new ACRE program,
it is not surprising that these three crops domi-
nated ACRE enrollment. Producers of these
crops know that the probability of a CCP pay-
ment for the 2009–2012 crop years is low and
Figure 2. Counter-Cyclical Payments by Crop Year
Figure 3. 2009 Average Crop Revenue Election Farm Enrollment by State
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rect payment for a potential ACRE payment.
According to Barnaby (2010a), some southern
producers of these crops are likely to receive
a 2009 ACRE payment as well.
If pricesfor cotton and peanuts improve in the
future, ACRE could become a viable risk man-
agement tool for more southern producers. Oth-
erwise, the election of a revenue-based pro-
tection program that has a high participation cost
with low potential coverage will continue to be
avoided. Irrigated ACRE benchmark revenues
for corn, cotton, and peanuts exist in many
southern states. Because yields are generally
stable as a result of available water, ACRE sup-
port for irrigated crops will be relevant to price
alone, further discouraging program election.
Supplemental Revenue Assurance
Producers accustomed to the historical ad hoc
disaster programs found the new SURE crop
assistance program to be quite complex and
potentially weaker in its support capacity in
comparison. Ad hoc programs were yield-based
crop and farm-specific in their calculation of
assistancewith no considerationof any revenues.
The new permanent program is diametrically
opposite of the old programs. Southern crop di-
versity historically has shown that one or two
crops may fail but other crops may not. One crop
with adequate production can pull the total farm
revenue up to a level that precludes a significant
SURE payment or could even result in no SURE
payment. In addition, cropping systems using
cotton, peanuts, and rice are often more diver-
sified than corn, soybeans, or wheat farms and
typically will not enjoy the level of coverage
SURE provides for more mono- or bicultural
systems. The old ad hoc program would allow
for segregation of crops and farms and a suc-
cessful crop would not be included.
Producers with irrigated acreage discovered
that crop revenues that are combined into the
total farm revenue will create dramatic de-
creases in SURE coverage. In fact, many sce-
narios indicate that irrigated production could
negate any SURE benefit. Many southern pro-
ducers use irrigation extensively, which will
impact their risk mitigation as opposed to the
ad hoc programs in which irrigated farms were
normally exclusive of dryland farms.
Producers were able to start applying for
2008 SURE payments in January 2010. As
a result of favorable 2008 growing conditions
in much of theSouth,2008 SURE payments are
notexpected tobe largeinmuch ofthesouthern
region. However, for the 2009 crop year, poor
weather conditions in the South combined with
low prices could lead to significant SURE
payments for many producers.
Interaction between Commodity Programs
The interaction between the commodity pro-
grams will become more apparent at the end of
2010. Because both ACRE and SURE pay-
ments are delayed foran entire crop year, actual
results cannot be tabulated at this point. The
2009 ACRE payments will not be issued until
at least October 2010 and the application pro-
cess for 2009 SURE payments will occur after
November 2010. However, the potential in-
teractions between the programs are discussed
subsequently.
SURE is implicitly impacted by ACRE,
DCP, and crop insurance. The farm revenue
calculation includes 15% of all direct payments
and the total of all CCPs and ACRE payments.
Election of ACRE reduces the direct payment
for each individual farm by 20%, thereby re-
ducing the effect of the direct payment calcu-
lation to the farm revenue. High-value base
crops such as cotton, peanuts, and rice should
gain a small benefit from this feature. ACRE
Figure 4. 2009 U.S. Average Crop Revenue
Election Enrollment by Crop
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of the total ACRE payment. In some cases,
producers receiving a large ACRE payment
will not be eligible for a SURE payment.
However, some producers will hit the payment
limit on ACRE payments and will be eligible
for additional SURE payments.
CCPs influence SURE considerably, par-
ticularly because they are decoupled from
production unlike ACRE. Market-based plant-
ing decisions usually dictate the selection of
crops with higher price opportunities, which
leads producers to plant other crops when cot-
ton, rice, or peanut prices are down. If the price
of a high-value crop remains depressed for the
market year, a large CCP will be earned on the
base irrespective of the crops planted. This
scenario will diminish the SURE coverage on
the crops actually planted although the base
crop receiving the CCP benefit may not have
been planted. Conversely, should the price on
the commodity not planted rise and the CCP
decline or disappear, the producer will gain
a greater gap indemnity from SURE.
The ACRE program only covers eligible
crops that are planted (or considered planted).
This coupling of production to program support
creates a balancing of exposure by the gov-
ernment in declining revenue situations. SURE
is triggered by a loss of primarily yield and
ACRE payments can be initiated by a loss in
price and/or yield. The relationship between
ACRE and SURE is quite complex because
a multitude of variables are in play. If ACRE is
triggered mainly by yield loss on a state basis,
then a corresponding increase in price for the
commodity may occur. This would affect the
SURE calculation on revenue for crop pro-
duction and may drop the ACRE payment as
well as creating a double negative. However, if
the price moves enough to reduce ACRE pay-
ments substantially, a gain in the gap coverage
by SURE could be realized.
Many have expressed concerns that ACRE
revenue payments overlap with crop revenue
insurance. However, Zulauf, Schnitkey, and
Langemeier (2010) note that although pro-
ducers can receive both an ACRE payment and
a crop insurance indemnity on the same crop,
the programs do not necessarily cover the same
portion ofthe risk distribution. In their analysis,
the overlap between ACRE payments and in-
surance indemnities was less than 5%. How-
ever, they found a much larger overlap between
ACRE and SURE payments. Barnaby (2010b)
also discusses potential overlap between com-
modity programs and various methods to re-
duce the overlap.
Summary
Producers in the southern region of the U.S.
were confronted with a choice between the old
DCP program and a new coupled revenue pro-
gram in the 2008 Farm Bill. As discussed, many
factors shaped their decisions to remain with the
traditional policy. The signup data for the DCP
and ACRE programs certainly illuminate the
profound differential in target prices vs. actual
market prices as incorporated by each support
program. Three states had no farms electing
ACRE and four others had less than 50. Ex-
cluding Oklahoma, less than 1% of all farms in
13 southern states made the ACRE election.The
policy implication reinforces the attested reality
that farm bills and farm policy are regional in
scope and nature. It is unfortunate that the
ACRE program could not have been more in-
clusive in its context, but the same could be said
for the DCP program in the 2002 statute that
seemingly favored southern crops.
The tool kit for managing risk was aug-
mented by the Supplemental Agricultural Di-
saster Assistance program and specifically the
SURE component for crops. Southern farmers
discovered that the differences between the
traditional ad hoc programs and the new ‘‘per-
manent’’ program are quite considerable. Cor-
relating crop insurance indemnity levels with
associated costs to production with the SURE
gap indemnity will be a challenge for agricul-
tural educators throughout the life of the bill.
The higher-value cropping systems in the south
and the diversity of those systems may very
well preclude the value of the additional tool.
The U.S. Congress (2008) has put into play
five systems of farm support for the American
Farmer: the Marketing Assistance Loan, Crop
Insurance, DCP, ACRE, and SURE. The intent
ofthelegislated policy istoprovidebroad-based
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2010 498revenue assistance to producers. Unfortunately,
the unintended consequence of expanding pro-
grams is the complexity that follows. Given the
choice between analyzing all the variables and
using new directions in their operations and
maintaining their proven course, most growers
will choose the latter. It is incumbent on our
educational system to assist them in graduating
above that leveltofully realize allthebenefitsof
the programs that can mitigate their risk.
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